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Abstract
We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by consider-
ing an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improve-
ment. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough,
the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.
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1 Introduction
In this note we extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by consider-
ing an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where
firms compete à la Cournot and incur in fixed costs of quality development.
Valletti (2000) shows that quantity-setting behaviour implies a non-binding
minimum quality standard (MQS), as Cournot competition is milder than
Bertrand’s. This conclusion, however, is based on a setting where undesir-
able environmental implications are not modelled and therefore any quality
distortion is solely driven by the firms’ profit incentives. Instead, our results
show that the presence of a negative external effect increasing in industry
output, if large enough, implies that the MQS will indeed bite at the regu-
lated equilibrium, bringing about an increase in qualities and welfare and a
decrease in the externality.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly market for vertically differentiated products supplied
by single-product firms. The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen
(1978). There is a continuum of consumers whose types are identified by
θ, uniformly distributed with density equal to one in the interval [0,Θ] (so
that total demand is equal to Θ). Parameter θ represents the consumers’
marginal willingness to pay for quality. Each consumer is assumed to buy at
most one unit of the vertically differentiated good in order to maximise the
following surplus function:
U = θqi − pi, (1)
where qi ∈ [0, Q] indicates the quality of the product and pi is the market
price at which that variety is supplied by firm i = H,L, with qH ≥ qL.
Therefore, the consumer who is indifferent between qH and qL is identified
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by the level of marginal willingness to pay θ̂ that solves
θ̂qH − pH = θ̂qL − pL, (2)
and therefore θ̂ = (pH − pL) / (qH − qL). Thus, market demand for the high-
quality good is xH = Θ − θ̂. We assume partial market coverage, so that
there is another consumer, identified by θ˜, who is indifferent between buying
qL or not buying at all:
θ˜qL − pL = 0, (3)
whereby θ˜ = pL/qL and the demand for the inferior variety is xL = θ̂ − θ˜.
Accordingly, we can define consumer surplus as follows:
CS =
∫
θ̂
θ˜
(kqL − pL)dk+
∫
Θ
θ̂
(zqH − pH)dz. (4)
This is what one needs to use in order to model Bertrand behaviour, while
inverse demands
pH = (Θ− xH) qH − qLxL
pL = (Θ− xH − xL) qL
(5)
are to be used under Cournot competition.
On the supply side, as in Ronnen (1991) and Motta (1993), inter alia,
firms incur in convex fixed costs of quality improvement Ci = cq
2
i
, i = H,L.
Variable costs are assumed away. Hence profit functions are πH = pHxH−cq
2
H
and πL = pLxL − cq
2
L
.
Production entails a negative environmental externality s = b(xH + xL)
2,
with b > 0, measuring the negative impact of production on the environment.
Also, note that consumers are assumed to be myopic, in the sense that (1)
does not account for the presence of pollution.1 Social welfare is determined
1It is worth noting that this is not a crucial assumption, as admitting the possibility for
consumers to be environmentally concerned, with U = θqi − pi − s would not modify the
expressions of θ̂ and θ˜ resulting from θ̂qH − pH − s = θ̂qL− pL− s and θ˜qL− pL− s = −s,
respectively.
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by the sum of profits and consumer surplus, minus the environmental exter-
nality:
W = CS + πH + πL − s. (6)
Competition takes place in two stages. In the first, firms choose qualities
and in the second they compete in quantities. Moves are simultaneous in
both stages, and the solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by
backward induction.
3 Results
To begin with, we characterise optimal outputs for any given quality pair:
xN
H
=
Θ(2qH − qL)
4qH − qL
; xN
L
=
ΘqH
4qH − qL
(7)
where superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium. The explicit derivation of
the Cournot equilibrium is omitted as it is known from Motta (1993).
We now turn to the first stage where the quality game takes place. We
will prove our results by manipulating the set of the first order conditions
in the two alternative cases under consideration, i.e., with or without MQS.
The relevant profit functions are:
πH =
qH
[
Θ2 (2qH − qL)
2 − cqH (4qH − qL)
2
]
(4qH − qL)
2
πL =
qL
[
Θ2q2
H
− cqL (4qH − qL)
2
]
(4qH − qL)
2
(8)
With no MQS, the first order conditions for non cooperative profit maxi-
mization are:
∂πH
∂qH
=
Θ2 (16q3
H
− 12q2
H
qL + 4qHq
2
L
− q3
L
)− 2cqH (4qH − qL)
3
(4qH − qL)
3
= 0, (9)
∂πL
∂qL
=
Θ2q2
H
(4qH + qL)− 2c (4qH − qL)
3
(4qH − qL)
3
= 0. (10)
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In the regulated case, the government introduces an MQS aimed at af-
fecting directly the behaviour of firm L. Firm H’s FOC remains unchanged,
while the regulator solves:
∂W
∂qL
=
Θ2 [4bqH (3qH − qL) + q
2
H
(4qH + 3qL)]− 4cqL (4qH − qL)
3
2 (4qH − qL)
3
= 0. (11)
For any pair of generic qualities (qH , qL) , MQS regulation is binding (and
therefore brings about an increase in both qualities) if ∂W/∂qL > ∂πL/∂qL.
Environmental effects being absent or not taken into account, we know from
Valletti (2000) that this does not apply. Here, however, the presence of a
negative externality implies that
sign
{
∂W
∂qL
−
∂πL
∂qL
}
= sign {4b (3qH − qL)− qH (4qH − qL)} (12)
whereby
∂W
∂qL
>
∂πL
∂qL
for all b >
qH (4qH − qL)
4 (3qH − qL)
(13)
and conversely. Therefore, if b is sufficiently large, the regulator attains a
welfare increase by introducing a binding MQS.
Correspondingly, social welfare
W =
Θ2
[
qH (12q
2
H
− 5qHqL + q
2
L
)− 2b (3qH − qL)
2
]
− 2c (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
2 (4qH − qL)
2
(14)
is positive for all
b <
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 5qHqL + q
2
L
)− 2c (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
2Θ2 (3qH − qL)
2
(15)
with
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 5qHqL + q
2
L
)− 2c (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
2Θ2 (3qH − qL)
2
>
qH (4qH − qL)
4 (3qH − qL)
(16)
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for all
c <
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 3qHqL + q
2
L
)
4 (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
(17)
Note also that both firms’ profits are positive for all
c < min
{
Θ2 (2qH − qL)
2
qH (4qH − qL)
2
,
Θ2q2
H
qL (4qH − qL)
2
}
(18)
so that any
c < min
{
Θ2 (2qH − qL)
2
qH (4qH − qL)
2
,
Θ2q2
H
qL (4qH − qL)
2
,
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 3qHqL + q
2
L
)
4 (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
}
(19)
ensures the positivity of profits and welfare for a generic quality pair.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 1 If
c < min
{
Θ2 (2qH − qL)
2
qH (4qH − qL)
2
,
Θ2q2
H
qL (4qH − qL)
2
,
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 3qHqL + q
2
L
)
4 (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
}
then profits and welfare are positive for all qH > qL, and
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 5qHqL + q
2
L
)− 2c (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
2Θ2 (3qH − qL)
2
>
qH (4qH − qL)
4 (3qH − qL)
.
Therefore, any
b ∈
(
qH (4qH − qL)
4 (3qH − qL)
,
Θ2qH (12q
2
H
− 5qHqL + q
2
L
)− 2c (q2
H
+ q2
L
) (4qH − qL)
2
2Θ2 (3qH − qL)
2
)
brings about the adoption of a binding MQS regulation.
The intuition behind this result is the following. In a partially covered
market with no environmental externality the only problem is the distortion
of hedonic qualities driven by profit incentives, and Cournot competition is
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soft enough to imply that the MQS will not bite (as we know from Valletti,
2000). If, conversely, a negative externality increasing in industry output
hinders welfare, there appears a tradeoff between increasing market coverage
and decreasing pollution. The balance between the two determines whether
the MQS is binding, which happens to be the case whenever the marginal
social cost associated to the external effect is high enough.
3.1 An example
Here we show a numerical example using appropriate parameter values. Set-
ting Θ = 1, c = 1/2 and b = 1/10, and solving numerically the relevant
system of FOCs (i.e., (9-10) in the unregulated case and (9-11) in the regu-
lated case), we obtain:
Table 1.
no MQS MQS
qH 0.25194 0.25232
qL 0.09022 0.09924
xH 0.45083 0.44547
xL 0.27458 0.27726
CS 0.04017 0.04111
s 0.05262 0.05223
W 0.00975 0.00981
The results with no MQS replicate those in Motta (1993) and Valletti
(2000). In the regulated case, (i) both qualities increase, and the same hap-
pens to consumer surplus and social welfare; while (ii) industry output, the
degree of vertical differentiation and the external effect decrease as compared
to the unregulated setting. In this respect, it is worth noting that total out-
put shrinks to contain the environmental consequences of production, and
7
the increase in consumer surplus is driven by the fact that a lower degree of
differentiation entails lower prices, more than offsetting the negative effect
caused by the output reduction.
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